India's Nuclear Missiles

India has a formidable new addition to its armoury — Agni-IV. The missile's first test flight under its earlier name, Agni-II Prime, in December 2010 ended in failure. But those problems have clearly been sorted out. Tuesday's test went without a glitch, and the missile successfully carried a 800-kg warhead to a distance of over 3,000 km. Agni-III missile, which was first successfully tested in 2007, already has a range of over 3,500 km when carrying a 1.5 tonne warhead. With less payload, this missile's range would be considerably greater. The success of Agni-III and Agni-IV reflects the maturing of capabilities in the long-range missile programme. The Agni missile family began with a ‘technology demonstrator' that combined the one-metre, solid-propellant first stage of India's first launch vehicle, the SLV-3, with a liquid-fuelled second stage. When the decision was taken to turn the technology demonstrator into an operational missile, the upper stage too was turned into a solid propellant one. This upper stage was equipped with a ‘flex nozzle' that could be swivelled to control the missile's orientation. Agni-II has a range of more than 2,000 km with a one-tonne payload. A single-stage version, Agni-I, with a range of about 700 km was subsequently developed.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) demonstrated a big leap in its ballistic missile capabilities with the two-stage, all-solid Agni-III. With a diameter double that of the one metre of its predecessors, this was the first Indian missile that can potentially be equipped with multiple warheads. This time the first stage too had a ‘flex nozzle,' a major technological achievement that considerably reduced the weight of the missile's control systems. With the addition of a solid third stage, the missile will be turned into Agni-V, with a range of over 5,000 km. This missile is scheduled to be tested in February. The missile team appears to have used its skills to upgrade Agni-II. Agni-II Prime, now known as Agni-IV, has a diameter of 1.2 metres, allowing a ‘flex nozzle' for the first stage as well. Further weight saving was brought about by having a composite second stage motor casing, instead of the earlier metal one. These weight reductions meant that more propellant could be loaded, thereby increasing the missile's range. Improvements in the missile's navigation systems, which now use laser gyros, as well as better onboard computers and avionics will make it more accurate too. Armed as they are with nuclear warheads, these are capable of causing immense destruction. The hope must be that they will never be put to actual use.

INDIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES & OPTIONS FOR ARMED FORCES

INDIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES & OPTIONS FOR ARMED FORCES
By Dr Subhash Kapila
(This paper was published in the July 2011 issue of SYNERGY Journal of the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi)
Introductory Observations
India today stands besieged both externally and internally both on its peripheries and lately within Heartland India too. In 2011 it can be said that India’s internal security threats are more immediate and intense than the external security threats. India’s internal security challenges become more threatening and complex as there exists in most cases of Indian internal security threats an external dimension and involvement of India’s traditional military adversaries, namely Pakistan and China.
India’s internal security threats and challenges today are no longer confined to Pakistan’s proxy war and state-sponsored terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and insurgencies in the North Eastern States as in yester years. India’s internal security threats today stands multiplied and magnified many times over in the past six years. Militancy, insurgency, Left Wing Extremism employing armed militias, suicide bombings and the Mumbai 26/11 type armed attack by Pakistan Army commando-trained squads which for 72 hours not only held the Indian nation-state to ransom defiantly in the financial citadel of Mumbai but also exposed how ill-prepared was the entire Indian State apparatus from its political leadership, its national security policy establishment, its slothful civil bureaucracy, the intelligence agencies and the Police Forces, in dealing with India’s internal security threats.
Externally sponsored threats to India’s internal security arise from a mix of geostrategic and geopolitical factors and the Indian Government cannot be blamed for it. The vast majority of India’s other internal security threats arise from the ineptitude of successive Indian Governments, both at the Central level and the States level, in terms of political misgovernance, neglected economic development of backward and under-developed regions within India and the inefficiency of the State apparatus represented by abdication of responsibility by the Civil Bureaucracy and the Police Forces. Here the responsibility lies squarely on the shoulders of India’s political leaders. They fail to provide leadership in tackling the threats and worse still fail to call for accountability of the civil bureaucracy, intelligence agencies and police forces for bringing threats to a boil.
Neglected over the years has been the effective border-management and border security of India’s extended land frontiers leading to porous borders which stood exploited for infiltration of proxy war elements and terrorists and also for gun-running for arms supplies to groups opposing the Indian State internally. The same applies to India’s coastal defense and surveillance as highlighted by the ease with which Pakistani terrorist could sneak into Mumbai by the sea route.
The Indian Armed Forces are primarily charged with the responsibility of protecting India from external threats. The Indian Armed Forces, and primarily the Indian Army, in terms of internal security, stands charged only with secondary responsibility for internal security. Primarily, India’s internal security is the responsibility of State Police Forces including States Armed Police Forces since ‘law and order as per the Indian Constitution is a ‘State Subject’.
However, the Central Government cannot absolve itself of responsibility and accountability for laxity in anticipating and strongly dealing with internal security threats. Cross-border intelligence and the weapons and equipment to fight insurgent threats need to be provided by the Central Government and so also the imperatives for swift Central Government intervention employing the Central Police Forces at its command in strength and not piecemeal inductions.
These are imperatives for very good reasons that ‘internal security threats are not mere law and order problems to be dealt by State Governments. Internal security threats are an assault on India’s sovereignty and its “National Honor” and dictates the imperatives of Central Government determined intervention.
The Indian Army of late is increasingly being looked upon and inevitably being drawn into coping with India’s internal security challenges due to the failure of the political leadership, civil bureaucracy and the police forces.
Regrettably, ignoring the larger issue of India’s national security and defense of India against external threats, the Indian Army is being increasingly being called upon for “firefighting” the internal security threats by India’s political establishment both at the Central Government level and the State Government levels. In this way the Indian Army is being diverted from its primary responsibilities and with increasing internal security commitments, its combat efficiency and training and the wear and tear of its combat equipment to deal with external security threats are being seriously impaired.
Worse still, is the lack of realization in India’s political leadership that the Indian Army is trained and psychologically conditioned for conventional war in which the enemy is identifiable and the enemy is to be liquidated by even disproportionate force. Indian Army committal to Internal Security roles places a heavy psychological burden on the Officers and Soldiers as it finds distasteful to use conventional force of arms against its own countrymen.
Externally generated and internally driven threats, are likely to multiply in the coming years. The Indian Government and policy establishment needs to seriously grapple with the crucial question as to how long can the Indian Army be diverted from its primary responsibility of defense of India and safeguarding its territorial integrity to get over-stretched in internal security commitments.
Till such time India’s governing political elite and its national security and policy establishment comes out with effective solutions to remove the ‘root causes’ of India’s internal security threats and putting into place effective civil and police internal security mechanisms, the Indian Army in all probabilities would continue to be called by the Government for “Fire Fighting’ India’s internal security threats.
Contextually therefore, the Indian Army is left with no alternative but to examine options as to how best it can undertake internal security challenges management without compromising its primary responsibility of India’s national defense and safeguarding its territorial integrity.
The main theme of this Paper, “INDIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES & OPTIONS FOR ARMED FORCES” is being examined under the following heads:
• India’s Internal Security Challenges: The Wide Spectrum of Threats Posed
• India’s Internal Security Threats: Factors Beyond the Control of the Indian Armed Forces.
• Indian Armed Forces Overall Options
• Indian Army: Advisories to the Government for Widening and Stiffening India’s Internal Security Grid Under Army Control
• Indian Army: In-House Configurations/ Steps to Manage Internal Security Threats
Henceforth in the discussion of this Paper, it is the Indian Army that will be referred to, as it is the largest component of the Armed Forces that is called upon to shoulder to tackle internal security threats. It does not belittle the tremendous contribution of the Indian Air Force which would increasingly be called upon to provide operational support in many different ways. So also would be the case for the Indian Navy which as it is providing valuable assistance in internal security roles in the Kashmir Valley.
India’s Internal Security Challenges: The Wide Spectrum of Threats Posed
India faces a myriad of internal security challenges of different hues and intensity all along its peripheries and in India’s Heartland States too. This significantly raises the bars high for the Indian Army as the main component of the Indian Armed Forces that has to grapple with these challenges. Each of the internal security challenges poses its own characteristic manifestation in terms of levels of violence, hostile manpower deployed against the Indian State and the firepower and destructive capabilities that these threats can bring to bear in threatening India’s internal security.
This raises serious problems for the Indian Army in terms of force configurations and training required to deal with internal security challenges as the Indian Army does not have the resources to raise operational task-specific or area-specific forces.
Till a decade or so back, India’s main security challenges were more localized on two extreme ends of the country, namely in Jammu & Kashmir and the North East States beginning with Nagaland and then extending to Mizoram and Manipur. In Jammu &Kashmir the challenging threat was of Pakistan’s proxy war and terrorism conducted by Pakistan through Pakistan Jihadi outfits and Kashmiri militants aimed at ‘secession’ of the region from India on religious grounds. In the North Eastern States it was a mix of secession based on ethnic identity issues.
The internal security threats here were potent as by virtue of geographical contiguity or proximity, Pakistan more notably and China in the North East fuelled the security threats. Contiguity and proximity ensured an unending supply of weapons and explosives to groups challenging the Indian State.
In the North East, India’s internal security threats have multiplied with the emergence of internal armed insurrections like the ULFA and Bodo liberation movement in Assam, and similar threats in Manipur. Of late, China is reported to have resumed a more active and aggressive involvement with these anti-Indian armed movements.
In the past decade, India has to cope with internal armed movements like the Naxalite and the Maoist armed insurrections extending from Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkand, and Chattisgarh to Andhra and parts of Maharashtra. Here the challenge was more internalized and springing from issues of economic deprivation, under-development, and misgovernance. Weapons, explosives and equipment here were infiltrated through Bangladesh and Nepal through the involvement of Pakistan ISI.
Over the years, the Indian Army has largely successfully coped with these threats whenever called upon to do so and at times with one hand tied by the political masters. The point sorely missed by India’s political leaders and the policy establishment is that this task has been done at great cost to the Indian Army in terms of its operational effectiveness, training and war-preparedness.
India’s Internal Security Threats: Factors Beyond the Control of The Armed Forces
Factors beyond the control of the Armed Forces and which affect the Indian Army’s effective operational management of internal security threats, when directed to undertake such onerous responsibilities need to be spelt out before options open can be examined.
The Indian nation-state has now been involved in coping with internal security threats for nearly half a century and India’s political leadership and its policy establishment should have learnt the relevant lessons by now.
By now India’s political leaders should have provided a stable domestic political environment by good governance and equitable economic development which could not be exploited by India’s military adversaries to pose internal security threats to India. Similarly good political governance would have pre-empted political and economic discontent from erupting in internal security threats.
Regrettably this has not taken place and the blame squarely falls on the shoulders of the political rulers of India.
The Indian Army’s onerous task of liquidating or neutralizing India’s internal security threats become that more magnified and complex, when the following factors are taken into account, as they lie beyond the control of the Indian Army, and yet they vitally affect the overall degree of success that the Indian Army can achieve when called upon to shoulder internal security crises:
• Politicization of internal security issues for narrow political gains and vote-bank politics at the cost of India’s national security e.g. AFSPA removal sought by J&K Sate Government.
• Central Government-State Governments lack of synchronization of internal security operations, again as a result of politicization of internal security issues especially in States where the State Government is from a different political dispensation.
• Central Government taking refuge for its inactivity or mishandling of internal security threats on the plea that law and order is a State Subject. The Central Government conveniently fails to distinguish the reality that internal security threats are a national security threat and not a State law and order problem only.
• Intelligence agencies penetration of insurgent groups and terrorist outfits is non- existent limiting pre-emptive operations by security forces.
• Intelligence supplied by Central intelligence agencies is not specific but more general and routine in nature in the manner of metrological warnings.
• State police forces have by temperament and having yet not been trained to execute audacious offensive operations against insurgents/ terrorists/militants.
• Indian Police Officers whether with Central or State Police Forces engaged in coping with internal security threats do not lead from the front and fail to provide exemplary leadership
• Central Government does not assist the State Governments to acquire advanced weapons and equipment for the States Police Forces engaged in internal security operations.
• Reluctance of the Central Government to pass strong deterrent laws that can be used against terrorists and insurgents indulging in attacking the sovereignty of the Indian State. Regrettably again, politicizing internal security, laws like TADA and POTA which provided some deterrence against internal security threats were scrapped by Governments for narrow political gains.
The above is only a sampling of the flaws that exist in India’s internal security management. Some may be tempted to ask as to what is the relevance of all of the above to the challenges that the Indian Army has to face when called upon to handle internal security operations.
The answer is that all of the above fundamentally affect the success of the Indian Army in internal security operations. If all of the above flaws are removed by the Central Government, there may not exist a necessity to call on the Indian Army to get involved. Further, if the first line of defense in the form of Central Police Forces, State Police Forces and intelligence agencies were properly honed up and yet the Indian Army is to be called in to deal with an extreme internal security crisis it would not have to start from scratch for “Fire Fighting” internal security threats spawned by abdication of States authority at all levels, as presently it is the situation.
Lastly, while on this aspect, it needs to be reiterated that every time the Indian Army regains control over internal security threats in a given area, the gains are frittered away by the State Governments in not providing effective political governance to reinforce the gains made by the Indian Army. This has been particularly noticeable in Jammu & Kashmir.
Indian Armed Forces Overall Options
The Indian Armed Forces and more specifically, the Indian Army, if they had an option, would strongly prefer not to get involved in the operational handling of India’s internal security threats.
In view of the increasing aggressiveness of the Pakistan Army and the Chinese PLA in generating internal security threats against India, both born out of their control of their respective national foreign policies, India’s external security threats are becoming enhanced and more so when all indicators point towards an increasing military collusiveness between Pakistan and China.
In the above circumstances the Indian Army should be left free from internal security commitments to solely concentrate on the external security threats. Their operational focus should not be divided by diversion to internal security threats managements wherein in most cases the underlying causes of internal security threats presently active in the hinterland are political in nature and call for political solutions, which the Indian Army cannot provide. But on the contrary, the call on Indian Army for coping with internal security is increasing.
Consequently, the Indian Army gets straitjacketed into shouldering responsibilities to combat India’s internal security threats. Straitjacketed thus, the India Army is left with only two limited options as follows:
• Indian Army Advisories to the Government for Widening and Stiffening India’s Internal Security Grid Under Army Control
• Indian Army In-house Configurations/Steps to Manage Internal Security Threats
The Indian Army Advisories recommended to be made to the Government may be viewed as an option to make the Army more streamlined, effective and in a higher state of readiness to meet Internal Security threats without affecting the operational readiness of Army Formations as they would be cut out from Internal Security commitments.
As far as the Indian Army’s own in-house configurations/steps required to be taken, there is a much wider scope available than what is briefly discussed in this Paper.
Indian Army Advisories to the Government for Widening and Stiffening India’s Internal Security Grid Under Army Control
Emergence of multi-faceted and complex internal security challenges with propensity for increasing use of sophisticated weapons and military tactics against the Indian State dictate the imperative that internal security threats are no longer mere ‘law and order problems’ and cannot be left with all ambiguities to different Constitutional Lists.
Consequently, it follows that the Home Ministry, civil bureaucrats and the police machinery are inadequately equipped mentally, by training or by experience to handle and manage India’s growing internal security threats. Nor can the challenge be met by the creation of another Ministry of Internal Security Affairs as its leadership and staffing would have the same limitations as the Home Ministry has. The Home Ministry can continue only with its existing functions of ‘law and order’ management minus internal security management and control.
India’s internal security now needs to be handled and managed by only one agency that is maintained, equipped and trained for dealing with ‘armed threats’ and that is the Indian Army.
The Indian Army can best leave the existing Central Police Forces with the Home Ministry with the exception of the Border Security Force and the Assam Rifles which need to be placed under India Army control.
Encapsulating, the recommendations that one would like to advance in this direction, these are as follows:
• India’s internal security management is transferred by the Government to the charge of the Indian Army on the lines outlined above. This is distinct from ‘law and order’ management which needs to be managed by State Governments with active assistance of the Home Ministry.
• The Indian Army should push the Government to widen and stiffen the internal security grid in two major ways to enable the Indian Army to effectively manage internal security threats.
• First and most urgent is for the Government is to sanction the raising and spread of Indian Army static formations in the form of Area Headquarters and Sub Area Headquarters. Priority should be given first to establish these in States facing Left Wing Extremism. Later it could spread across the country.
• Government should sanction expansion of the embodied Territorial Army Battalions that can be placed under these Static Formation Headquarters.
• Expanded embodied Territorial Army Battalions should be raised from the large reservoir of Army Ex-Servicemen who as trained Army personnel would only require specialized training for counter-insurgency training
• The National Security Guards command and control and organization require restructuring. The teeth arm of National Security Guards is wholly drawn from the Indian Army which was used in Mumbai 26/11. It is axiomatic that these highly trained commandoes should be under the command of an Indian Police Service Officer because the major component of this Force for VIP protection duties is drawn from Central Police Forces.
• The two components of the National Security Guards need to be bifurcated and the Commando Groups and the new Nodal Hubs be placed under the direct command of the Army Headquarters and expanded as Army outfits for stiffening the Internal Security Grid under Army control.
• The Government be advised to sanction raising of extra infantry battalions that should come under command of Static Formation Headquarters which can be periodically be rotated to regular formations. In other words these extra infantry battalions would be over and above the present sanctioned strength of the Indian Army.
• The present ‘empire building’ of Central Police Forces should be put to an end and those budgetary allocations be diverted to Army Headquarters under a separate budgetary head of Internal Security Management.
• The system of Unified Command Headquarters at State level under the Chief Minister of the affected State for dealing with Internal Security threats be scrapped for two very good reasons. First, the Chief Ministers view threats only from the political angle overlooking security imperatives. Secondly, the Army Commanders at different levels get unnecessarily drawn into political games of the Chief Ministers who exploit their direct access to the Home Minister to distort national security perspectives. And internal security imperatives are sacrificed at the altar of political expediency.• Indian Army should not be committed to any internal security roles without first providing the cover of AFSPA.
The Army Headquarters can refine the above recommendations while retaining the essence of what is recommended in forwarding the Advisories to the Government as recommended above.
Indian Army: In-House Configurations/Steps to Manage Internal Security Threats
The Indian Army without waiting for the above advisories to materialize, since a lot of turf battles would be involved for the Advisories to take shape, needs to carry out a number of in-house configurations/steps for better management of internal security management duties that are increasingly likely to be thrust on it.
The major steps required to be taken in this direction by the Indian Army are spelt out in outline as follows:
• Establishment of a “Directorate of Internal Security Management” under the command of a Lieutenant General at Army Headquarters with adequate Staff and charged with monitoring internal security related intelligence and contingency planning for existing internal security threats management and even threats-in-the-making.
• In the overall Indian Army deployment planning, the resources of additional Infantry Battalions to be raised for Internal Security are earmarked for Internal Security Management are earmarked for being under command of Static Area Headquarters and Sub Area Headquarters as contingency back-up to Territorial Army units.
• Local intelligence of insurgency-hit areas is always limited and not readily forthcoming to the Army. The proposed Directorate be charged with collection, collation, and making useful readings of the situation for the Army Headquarters.
• The proposed Directorate of Internal Security Management would essentially have to operate through the expanded Static Formation Headquarters and the resources as outlined above to be placed under them for internal security management.
The Army Headquarters would be better placed to delineate chains of command and coordination of the Internal Security Grid. It would also require to work out as to how in this widened and stiffened Internal Security Grid, the challenge of integrating Civil Police Organizations and the State Police Forces when added to the Army’s Internal Security Grid can be seamlessly achieved, including State intelligence networks.
In terms of weapons and equipments required for Indian Army deployments in the proposed Internal Security Grid, attention would be required to plan, acquire and equip forces with specialized internal security weapons, communication equipment for decentralized operations and internal security specialized protected vehicles which are available within the country. These are within the knowledge of the Indian Army hierarchy and need not be spelt out in this Paper.
Concluding Observations
The Indian Army has never shied away from meeting and neutralizing internal security threats that have plagued India ever since its independence in 1947. It has valiantly met these challenges within the constraints of its resources available and most of the time with one hand tied politically just to uphold the Oath taken by Officers and Soldiers of defending India against external and internal threats.
Most of India’s internal security threats arise from failures of India’s political leaders, and lack of good governance in not ensuring India’s equitable political, economic and societal development. Internal security threats therefore require “political solutions” of which there is a deficit presently. This lies outside the domain of the Indian Army and they can do little in this direction.
In the prevailing Indian political milieu, the Indian Army has only one option open to it and that is to accept the responsibilities thrust upon it by the Indian nation-state in terms of coping and managing India’s internal security threats. However, it cannot shoulder these onerous responsibilities within available resources. The important point that India’s military hierarchy should impress on the political leadership is that the force structures authorized and financial allocations to the Indian Army do not incorporate Internal Security commitments.
The Indian Army should firmly impress upon the Central Government that while it is their political call to decide whether the Indian Army should be diverted from its extended defense of India’s borders against implacable foes, the political leaders must ensure that the Internal Security structure and mechanisms are drastically transformed to deal with evolving threats and pays heed to the Indian Army Advisories outlined above and allocates additional resources to the Indian Army under a separate budgetary head of ‘Internal Security Management’.

Biosphere reserve

Biosphere reserves are areas of terrestrial and coastal ecosystems promoting solutions to

reconcile the conservation of biodiversity with its sustainable use. They are internationally

recognized, nominated by national governments and remain under sovereign jurisdiction of

the states where they are located. Biosphere reserves serve in some ways as 'living

laboratories' for testing out and demonstrating integrated management of land, water and

biodiversity. Collectively, biosphere reserves form a world network: the World Network of

Biosphere Reserves (WNBR). Within this network, exchanges of information, experience and

personnel are facilitated. There are over 500 biosphere reserves in over 100 countries.

How did the biosphere reserve concept start?

The origin of Biosphere Reserves goes back to the "Biosphere Conference" organized by

UNESCO in 1968. This was the 1st intergovernmental conference examining how to

reconcile the conservation and use of natural resources, thereby foreshadowing the present-

day notion of sustainable development. This Conference resulted in the launching of the

UNESCO "Man and the Biosphere" (MAB) Programme in 1970. One of the original MAB

projects consisted in establishing a coordinated World Network of sites representing the

main ecosystems of the planet in which genetic resources would be protected, and where

research on ecosystems as well as monitoring and training work could be carried out. These

sites were named as "Biosphere Reserves", in reference to the MAB programme itself.

What are the functions of biosphere reserves?

Each biosphere reserve is intended to fulfil 3 basic functions, which are complementary and

mutually reinforcing:

-

a conservation function - to contribute to the conservation of landscapes, ecosystems,

species and genetic variation;

a development function - to foster economic and human development which is socio-

culturally and ecologically sustainable;

a logistic function - to provide support for research, monitoring, education and

information exchange related to local, national and global issues of conservation and

development.

What are the biosphere reserve zones?

Biosphere reserves are organized into 3 interrelated zones:

the core area

the buffer zone

the transition area

Only the core area requires legal protection and hence can correspond to an existing

protected area such as a nature reserve or a national park. This zonation scheme is applied

in many different ways in the real world to accommodate geographical conditions, socio-

cultural settings, available legal protection measures and local constraints. This flexibility can

be used creatively and is one of the strongest points of the biosphere reserve concept,

facilitating the integration of protected areas into the wider landscape.

What are the benefits of biosphere reserves?

The biosphere reserve concept can be used as a framework to guide and reinforce projects

to enhance people's livelihoods and ensure environmental sustainability. UNESCO’s

recognition can serve to highlight and reward such individual efforts. The designation of a

site as a biosphere reserve can raise awareness among local people, citizens and

government authorities on environmental and development issues. It can help to attract

additional funding from different sources. At the national level, biosphere reserves can serve

as pilot sites or ‘learning places’ to explore and demonstrate approaches to conservation and

sustainable development, providing lessons which can be applied elsewhere. In addition,

they are a concrete means for countries to implement Agenda 21, the Convention on

Biological Diversity (for example the Ecosystem Approach), many Millennium Development

Goals (for example on environmental sustainability), and the UN Decade of Education for

Sustainable Development. In the case of large natural areas which straddle national

boundaries, transboundary biosphere reserves can be established jointly by the countries

concerned, testifying to long-term cooperative efforts.

Who is in charge?

UNESCO does not require any change in law or ownership: each biosphere reserve has its

own system of governance to ensure it meets its functions and objectives. The management

system of a biosphere reserve needs to be open, evolving and adaptive in order for the local

community to better respond to external political, economic and social pressures, which

would affect the ecological and cultural values of the area. Hence it is necessary to set up an

appropriate governance mechanism, for instance a committee or board, to plan and co-

ordinate all the activities of all the actors concerned, each within their own mandate and

competence. Usually a biosphere reserve coordinator is named as the contact person for all

matters dealing with the biosphere reserve.

Who pays?

Everyone. The level of funding depends on the nature and extent of the projects and

activities undertaken. Often, additional funding is not needed: existing budgets can be

aligned to meet shared goals. Industry, tour operators, charitable foundations, research

funding agencies, governments, local municipalities can all help. Continual support from

government - even if only moral and technical - ensures good connections with national

policy and international efforts related to sustainable development. UNESCO can provide

advice and occasionally seed funds to initiate local efforts; these can help broker projects or

to set up durable financial mechanisms.

What is the difference between a biosphere reserve and a natural World Heritage site?

A biosphere reserve is a representative ecological area with 3 mutually reinforcing functions:

conservation, sustainable development and logistic support for scientific research and

education. Collectively, all biosphere reserves form a World Network linked by exchanges of

experience and knowledge. They are part of a UNESCO scientific programme, governed by

a "soft law", the Statutory Framework.

Natural World Heritage sites must be of outstanding universal value in accordance with the

UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972).

Efforts to enhance local development and to promote scientific understanding are means to

ensure the protection of the natural World Heritage values.

In some instances, a core area of a biosphere reserve can meet World Heritage criteria: the

usually larger biosphere reserve can therefore serve as a complementary means to protect

the integrity of the World Heritage site.

Can a biosphere reserve be "de-designated"?

The Statutory Framework makes provision for a periodic review every 10 years. The periodic

review reports are prepared by the concerned authority, and forwarded to the UNESCO

Secretariat. The reports are examined according to a set procedure. In the event that a site

designated as a biosphere reserve does not satisfy the criteria, after a reasonable period of

time the area will no longer be referred to as a biosphere reserve of the World Network. To

date, this procedure has never reached this conclusion: however several counties have

voluntarily withdrawn "non-functional" sites and this has been commended by the MAB

International Coordination Council.

How does UNESCO ensure that biosphere reserves function properly?

Biosphere reserves are not the object of a binding international convention or treaty but are

governed by a "soft law" -- the Statutory Framework for Biosphere Reserves -- adopted by

the UNESCO General Conference and which all countries are committed to apply. In

consequence, the UNESCO Secretariat does not have a ‘police function’ and it is the

responsibility of each country, through its MAB National Committee or Focal Point, to ensure

that the biosphere reserves respond to the criteria and function properly. For this, in most

countries it is not necessary to enact special national legislation for biosphere reserves but

rather to use the existing legal frameworks for nature protection and land/water management.

This being said, an increasing number of countries are now giving biosphere reserves a

special legal status in order to reinforce their application. In the case of a perceived problem,

e.g. plans to construct an oil refinery within the site, the biosphere reserve status should be

used as a platform for dialogue to arrive at an optimal solution. The MAB Secretariat will

remind the concerned MAB National Committee/Focal Point of its responsibility in such

cases.

How do I get involved?

Visit the UNESCO MAB Biosphere Reserve Directory to read details on all biosphere

reserves, including contact information.

Contact also the National MAB Committees and focal points for information on national

action on biosphere reserves, including on plans for new biosphere reserves.

The UNESCO-MAB Secretariat would be interested to receive donations of high quality

photographs of biosphere reserves for its own publications, for which all photo credits would

of course be acknowledged.

___________________________________

A biosphere reserve is an area of land or water that is protected by law in order to support the conservation of ecosystems, as well as the sustainability of mankind’s impact on the environment. This means that each biosphere reserve aims to help scientists and the environmental community figure out how to protect the world’s plant and animal species while dealing with a growing population and its resource needs. Biosphere reserves were created by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under a program called Man and the Biosphere (MAB) in 1968. Since its creation, MAB has helped dozens of countries create biosphere reserves. In order to create a reserve, a country must suggest an area of land for the MAB to approve.

There are three main parts to a biosphere reserve. The first part is called the core zone. This zone is strongly protected for the conservation of biological diversity — to make sure that different types of plants and animals are safe from human impact. The second part is called a buffer zone. These zones surround the core zones and provide a space for environmental research, recreation, and tourism.

The last part is called a transition zone. A transition zone is for local communities that have a hand in managing the resources of the area through farming, fisheries, and other non-governmental activities. Ultimately, the ways that these three zones operate depend on the specific needs of the biosphere reserve they are in.

Each biosphere reserve is governed by the country in which it resides. This allows each country or state to use a biosphere reserve for the region’s specific needs, therefore making sure that every reserve is used wisely and for the benefit of the communities around it. Thus, each biosphere reserve has different laws and regulations about its maintenance.

There are numerous benefits to biosphere reserves. Not only can they help raise awareness of mankind’s impact on the environment, but they support local communities in the maintenance of the natural environment around them. A biosphere reserve is also used for environmental recreation and education, meaning people can use the reserve to teach others about the environment, as well as use the land for nature activities, such as hiking and fishing. Biosphere reserves have also been quite helpful to scientists because the reserves create large areas of land for people to research plants, animals, and the overall conditions of the ecosystem.

Human rights and the Commonwealth

The fracas at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth over a proposal to appoint a human rights monitor has reopened an old debate that pits national sovereignty against an international human rights regime. India and Sri Lanka were among the countries that opposed the idea of a Human Rights Commissioner for the Commonwealth nations. The proposal has been given up, at least for now. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is possibly the finest document of the world's aspiration to treat all human beings equally and with dignity. Even though the UDHR was assailed from the beginning by some as a western construct that ignored cultural and religious differences, most countries, including India, are signatories to it and its various covenants. What really undermines the international rights framework is the perception that the international human rights mechanisms are a weapon in the hands of powerful countries to lord it over less powerful states, through economic sanctions or other means. The perception is strengthened by the flagrant double standards in the way rights issues are raised. For instance, Australia and the United Kingdom, in the forefront of the Commonwealth human rights campaign, are quite content to ignore alleged violations in China or India, where their own interests — principally economic ones — are involved. Canada is outraged by rights violations during Sri Lanka's military victory over the LTTE, but is quiet about the appalling toll of civilian deaths in U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Another eye-opener has been in the western handling of the Arab Spring in Libya on the one hand, and in Bahrain on the other.
It is for this reason that India — which has resisted cultural and religious exceptionalism to human rights at the United Nations — was correct in opposing the Commonwealth's efforts to impose another layer of international scrutiny into the conduct of member-states. This is not to give a clean bill of health to the Indian record: in some places, such as Jammu & Kashmir, in the North-East, and in areas hit by the Maoist insurgency, the shocking and repeated instances of rights violations by the security forces are a blot on the country's democratic credentials. But outside intervention cannot be the answer. Aside from enabling external actors with unclean hands to assume control of governance, it often ends up discrediting local efforts to improve the situation. It is understandable that the Commonwealth, a grouping of former British colonies, is striving to remain relevant in the present day. Meddling in the affairs of member-states, whether it is Pakistan, or Sri Lanka, or India or Zimbabwe, is not the way to go about it.